THE ACCEPTANCE OF A CUSTOMS DECLARATION

Author

Rossen Grozev[1]

 

This paper analyses the approach, adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its recent judgment in Case C-138/10 (“DP GROUP”), with respect to the legal significance of the acceptance by the customs authorities of a customs declaration. One of the basic questions, posed by the national jurisdiction, is whether the decision of the said authorities concerning the immediate acceptance of such a declaration should be regarded as a decision in accordance with Article 4, point 5 of the Community Customs Code (Council Regulation No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992). The response to this question to a large extent predetermines the outcome of the litigation in the main proceedings – namely, whether the acceptance decision as such could be challenged as contradicting the applicable substantive law.

The paper presents the factual context of the legal dispute and compares in detail the interpretative approaches adopted by the Advocate General, on one hand, and by the Court, on the other. It is argued that while the answers proposed by the Advocate General follow precisely the initially formulated questions by the national jurisdiction and apply impeccable legal logic in solving them, the standpoint of the Court is more direct, probably deprived of the sophisticated reasoning put forward by the Advocate General, but evidencing certain preference for straightforward solutions when a risk could arise for the creation of a potentially dangerous precedent allowing to challenge the decision for acceptance of a customs declaration on grounds of nullity.

On the basis of these different interpretative approaches – leading, however, to the same final result of denying the possibility for an incorrect declarant to avoid the imposition of eventual sanctions – the paper examines the re-formulation by the Court of the initially put preliminary questions. It is argued that this modification represents a peculiar feature of the judgment in Case C-138/10, since it seems difficult to allocate the radical re-drafting to any of the traditionally established categories of reasons for having recourse to such modifications. In this respect the paper discusses whether the particularity in question transcends the meaning of the judgment in its customs law context and reveals some new aspects of the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national jurisdictions in the process of their fruitful co-operation within the framework of the preliminary ruling procedure.

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[1] Lawyer linguist at the Court of Justice of the European Union.

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Линк към цялата статия на български език: ПРИЕМАНЕТО НА МИТНИЧЕСКА ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ В СВЕТЛИНАТА НА РЕШЕНИЕ ПО ДЕЛО „ДП ГРУП“ (С-138/10)

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