Comments on the Importance of these Values for the EU Legal Order and the Fundamental Rights Enshrined in the Charter
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Thomas von Danwitz, D.I.A.P. (ENA, Paris)
Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union
***Speech at the conference “Is the End of the Rule of Law in Today’s Global Context Imminent?”, organised by the Bulgarian Association of European Law – Sofia, 13.03.2026***
“World peace” – with these words the former French Foreign Minister Schuman started his famous declaration on 9 May 1950, presenting the plan for the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) laying down “common foundations for economic development”.
However, from the historical outset, it should be recalled that this community was intended to be only “a first step in the federation of Europe” that “will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims”. The founding fathers were well aware that – as it had already been elaborated in Kant’s essay on Eternal Peace (1795) – the mere refraining from hostilities and even the establishment of a federation of states was not sufficient to guarantee a lasting peace in Europe, unless the internal order of the participating states is governed by a republican constitution. In today’s language, Kant had in mind a constitution based on democratic principles and on the rule of law.[1]
These considerations were more clearly expressed in the preamble of the EEC Treaty which, although focusing primarily on the “economic and social progress”, highlighted the desire to “preserve and strengthen peace and freedom through this union of their economic forces”. Later, the preamble of the Single European Act underlined expressly that the promotion of the “the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights” contributes to the “preservation of international peace and security”.
I.
The essence of the values now enshrined in Article 2 TEU were recognized – denominated as principles – in Article F TEU (Maastricht) and in Article 6(1) and (2) TEU (Amsterdam). If Article 2 TEU is clearly inspired by these provisions, it has been decisively shaped by the preparatory works of the Convention on the Future of Europe proposing “a short list of fundamental European values” containing only “a hard core of values”.[2] Those values stem from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which reflect the spiritual and moral heritage of the European Union derived from Greek and Roman antiquity and, in particular, the ideas of the Enlightenment.
Article 2 TEU provides in its first sentence that “[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. The second sentence specifies that, “[t]hese values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”
1.
As a preliminary remark, I must admit that it is not straightforward to understand from the sole wording of Article 2 TEU the sense and, in particular, the relationship between the different elements referred to.
The structure of Article 2 TEU might suggest at a first glance, that the founding values of the Union are exclusively enumerated in the first sentence, while the second sentence does not contain values but characteristics of a society.[3] However, a further look reveals that the elements mentioned in both sentences are closely intertwined. Thus, the value of “equality” is specified by reference to “non-discrimination” and the “equality between women and men” as well as the “respect for democracy” by “pluralism”, “tolerance” and “solidarity”.[4] Quite similarly, the value of “solidarity” refers to the homonym title V of the Charter and to different treaty provisions giving concrete expression to the principle of mutual solidarity among Member States.[5] Against this backdrop, the elements mentioned in the second sentence of Article 2 TEU appear as emanations of the founding values listed in the first sentence sharing the same nature.
To sum up, Article 2 TEU enumerates in total twelve founding values of the Union. The number of twelve mirrors the symbolism of the twelve golden stars in the European flag, which stand for the union of the peoples of Europe in diversity and, more generally, for perfection and unity.[6]
2.
The substantive link between those values and the protection of fundamental rights becomes apparent from of the preamble of the Charter.
a.
The second limb of this preamble states that: “Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities [, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice].”
As it is further underlined in the third limb of this preamble, “[t]he Union contributes to the preservation and the development of these common values” and “[t]o this end, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.” In other words, the said common values constitute “la raison d’être” for the proclamation of the Charter.
b.
That link is likewise reflected in the very wording of Article 2 TEU, which refers not only to certain fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter – like “human dignity” guaranteed in its first Article or the “rights of persons belonging to minorities” specified in its Article 21(1) – but also to its titles III to VI, respectively entitled “freedom”, “equality”, “solidarity” and “justice”. Each title contains several rights, which give concrete expression to those founding values.
More importantly – the values “human dignity” and “respect for human rights” cover, in substance, all fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter, “[t]he dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights” and, in particular, it “is part of the substance of the rights laid down in this Charter”.
2.
A similar connection may be discerned for the value of “democracy”. The various emanations of democratic principles in the Member States and at the level of the European Union have, despite their difference, in common that they guarantee the “Right to free elections”, guaranteed in article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This guarantee provides that free elections are to be held “at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.” This basic democratic right is – as we all know – closely linked to the freedom of communication, the freedom of thought, the freedoms of expression und information and the freedom of peaceful assembly and of association “in particular in political … matters”, respectively guaranteed in articles 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter. The same is true for the prohibition of “[a]ny discrimination based on … political and any other opinion”, laid down in its article 21(1).
3.
Under the “rule of law”, all public powers act within the constraints set out by law and, in particular, the Treaties, the general principles of law and the fundamental rights, under the control of independent and impartial courts.[7] As it is impossible to protect fundamental rights effectively without the rule of law being respected, the Charter contains several provisions giving concrete expression to the rule of law. Thus, article 52 (1) of the Charter sets out that “[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.” In particular, specific elements of the rule of law are guaranteed as fundamental rights, notably in articles 47 and 49 of the Charter [providing respectively for the “Right to an effective remedy and a fair trial” and for “Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offenses and penalties”].
II.
In order to deepen further our reflection on the link between the founding values of the Union and the fundamental rights and the scope of the protection respectively guaranteed by Article 2 TEU and the Charter, it should be recalled that, according to its Article 51(1), the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and to the Member States “only when they are implementing Union law”. This provision ties the applicability of the Charter to national measures closely to the scope of material EU law. If, for example, the obligations set out in Article 19(1) TEU go further, they are nevertheless linked to “the fields covered by EU law”, in which Member States have to ensure effective judicial protection.
1.
In comparison, Article 2 TEU does not contain any reference neither to the implementation of EU law nor to the fields covered by this law. As the genesis of article 2 TEU confirms, the founding values of the Union are to be ensured “even … in the field of the Member State’s autonomous action (not affected by Union law)”.[8] Indeed, in accordance with Article 49 TEU, respect for the values set out in Article 2 TEU is a prerequisite for the accession to the European Union. The Union is thus composed of States which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to those values, which respect and undertake to promote them. On that textual basis, the Court has repeatedly held that Article 2 TEU is not merely a statement of policy guidelines or intentions, but contains legally binding values which are an integral part of the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order. The legal structure of the Union is based on the fundamental premiss that each Member State shares those values with all the other Member States.[9] It follows that compliance by a Member State with those values is an obligation – and a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from the Treaties. In other words, there is an obligation to comply with those values not only in order to accede to the European Union but also after the accession to this Union.[10]
2.
The protection of the rule of law in the national legal order and organisation of national political life is – of course – first and foremost a question for national constitutions. Outside the scope of application of EU law, it is as well only for the national constitutions to ensure the protection of fundamental rights. For this reason, the Court regularly recalls that neither Article 2 TEU nor any other provision of EU law requires Member States to adopt a particular constitutional model governing the relationship and interaction between the various branches of the State, in particular as regards the definition and delimitation of their competences.[11] In the same vein, the Court underlines that, according to Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union respects the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures. [12]
a.
At the same time, the jurisprudence of the Court underscores that in choosing their respective constitutional model, the Member States are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law and, in particular, with the requirements stemming from Article 2 TEU.[13] It is important to emphasize that these requirements are obviously not intended to replace the protection of “democracy”, the “rule of law” and “human rights” as they are granted by national constitutions. In essence, Article 2 TEU comes into play where national mechanisms protecting those values do – for one reason or another – not function properly. In other words, this article constitutes an explicit safeguard against systemic dysfunctions and, in particular, against regressions in the protection of those values in the Member States’ constitutional order.
b.
Thus, if Member States enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in implementing the principles of the rule of law in accordance with their fundamental political and constitutional structures and traditions, they adhere to a concept of “the rule of law” as a common value, which they have undertaken to respect at all times.[14] In this regard, the Court held namely in Repubblika that “[a] Member State cannot […] amend its legislation in such a way as to bring about a reduction in the protection of the value of the rule of law […]. The Member States are thus required to ensure that, in the light of that value, any regression of their laws on the organization of justice is prevented, by refraining from adopting rules which would undermine the independence of the judiciary”.[15]
In the same spirit, the value of “democracy” is not yet affected by any infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed in articles 10, 11, 12 and 21 of the Charter, but by the adoption of rules which are likely to undermine the right to free elections as such.
With regard to the different values relating to the protection of fundamental rights, Article 2 TEU does not require the Member States to respect, outside the scope of EU law, the level of protection guaranteed by the Charter. In such a situation, in particular the necessary compliance with the ECHR comes into play. However, by virtue of Article 2 TEU, Member States are in any event precluded from reducing their national standard of protection in a way that interferes with the essence of the fundamental rights laid down in the Charter.
III.
This leads to the question of the purpose of Article 2 TEU and, in particular, to the significance of the values laid down therein.
1.
Article 2 TEU resembles to similar provisions contained in the constitutions of several Member States, which lay down structural principles characterizing the national constitutional order.[16] Alike those provisions, it forms a constitutional “chapeau”-rule, laying down the core values of the Union which form “an integral part of the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order”[17] and – if you allow me an expression taken from the constitutional doctrine of my home country – radiate in the Union legal order as a whole.
The inscription in Article 2 TEU on the fundamental values of the European Union is designed to ensure the homogeneity of the national constitutional orders in so far as is indispensable for the cohesion, the unity and the proper functioning of the common legal order. In this perspective, it becomes perfectly clear that the values referred to in Article 2 TEU are not of a mere symbolic nature, but [are] crucial for the common legal order.
2.
Within the EU, the rule of law has been fundamental to the EU legal order since its very beginnings. The particular importance and shaping influence of the rule of law is – and you all know this – perfectly expressed in the idea of a “community of law”, which has been coined in 1962 by the first president of the European Commission Walter Hallstein[18] and which was taken up by the Court 24 years later in the seminal judgement Les Verts v Parliament. As a leitmotif of European integration, the rule of law constitutes, in metaphorical terms, the “glue” that keeps the Union together.
In this regard, the effective judicial protection, which is ensured by the Court in cooperation with the courts of the Member States, has always been of utmost importance. Indeed, the European single market would not function and the competition in this market would not be protected against distortions, if compliance with competition rules could not be supervised by the competent authorities and sanctioned by the courts. Systemic dysfunctions with regard to the rule of law would undermine mutual trust, which is a prerequisite for the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. In short, guaranteeing the rule of law is not “nice to have”, but vital for the success of European integration as a whole.
The necessity to ensure first and foremost the respect of the rule of law directly reflects the ideas of enlightenment. The priority given to the rule of law and, in particular, to the independence of the judiciary is impressively elaborated in the 78th essay of the Federal Papers (1788). Therein, Alexander Hamilton underlined that „[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is … essential in a limited Constitution. … Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” Hamilton elaborated that, “[t]his independence of the judges is … requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from … dangerous innovations in the government, … [and from] serious oppressions of the minor party in the community” and “… may [also] be an essential safeguard against … the [further] injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, [which is caused] by unjust and partial laws.”[19]
In a nutshell, even the most democratic legislative acts and the most impressive constitutional guaranties of minority rights are not worth the paper they are written on, without the power of independent courts to enforce these rights notably against state actors.
3.
The respect of democratic principles in the national order contributes to the democratic legitimacy of the Union, as both the executive and the legislative branches are involved in the decision making at EU level.[20]
In particular, the Court has underlined in two recent infringement cases, that political parties play a fundamental role in expressing the will of EU citizens in the system of representative democracy established by the Treaties, as their function is to field candidates in elections. Thus, the membership of a political party contributes significantly to the effective exercise of the right to stand for election.[21] In the light of these findings, the Court has held that, by denying EU citizens, who were nationals of another Member State, the right to become member of a political party, the Member States in question had failed to respect their obligations under Article 22 TFEU.[22]
In the seminal judgment Real Madrid, the Court underlined that Article 11 of the Charter constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society governed by the rule of law, and is one of the founding values of the European Union, laid down in Article 2 TEU.[23] Thus, although the press must not overstep certain bounds, particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog”.[24]
As the Court specified very recently in Commission v Hungary (Right to provide media services on a radio frequency), the freedom of the media associated with freedom of broadcasting guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter includes not only the right to impart information, but also, and inseparably, the right to use any appropriate means to disseminate information and transmit it to the widest possible audience.[25] If, as the Court specified, any national measure limiting or restricting broadcasters’ access to radio frequencies is liable to interfere with their freedom of the media associated with freedom of broadcasting,[26] such a measure might also influence the free forming of political opinion, which is vital in a pluralist, democratic society.
4.
A fundamental question, that the Court did not yet have to consider in this context is how to ensure that the use of artificial intelligence in the Union is respectful of our values and in particular compatible with the protection of fundamental rights. The complexity of this issue – not only for the Court but first and foremost for the European legislator – becomes crystal clear, when considering that, from today’s perspective, most AI systems are likely to be based on algorithms, which are programmed and trained outside the European Union under conditions under which the respect for our values is far from being ensured. The pending case Like Company (C-250/25) will be a first appetizer in this endeavour for the Court.
IV.
In conclusion, the establishment of a common legal order based on the common values laid down in Article 2 TUE has brought to Europe a lasting peace and the prosperity that the fathers of the Treaties had hoped for after centuries of repeated wars and destruction. The remarkable success of European Integration both in economic and political terms is not a historical coincidence and the founding values’ contribution is not a fairytale of democratic theory and humanist philosophy, but simply a matter of practical experience. In a wide range of empirical studies, economists confirmed that pluralistic democracies based on the rule of law tend to outperform autocracies, precisely due to the advantages of democracies in terms of accountability, press freedom, and institutional checks, which collectively enhance societal well-being.[27]
Despite all these achievements, the European Union and its Member States are facing multiple challenges, which are closely linked to the autocratic threats to our common values. Internationally, the rule of law is in poor condition as the rule-based international order is openly defied. In more and more parts of the World, it seems that constitutional checks and balances, where they exist, are simply undermined or even removed as annoying obstacles for the short-tempered political will. We see various forms of autocratic government flourishing outside and even inside the European Union.
But as regrettable as these developments might be, as judges we have to face the challenges that they bring about. In that respect, I am sorry to say that our main challenge lies not in the mere threat to the independence of the judiciary, namely by means of defamation or violence and the need for courage to withstand those threats. I rather fear to say that today the role of the third power within any republican form of government is faced with a particularly difficult alternative: Either to accept becoming a rather meaningless notary and, quite evidently, thereby legitimizing autocratic rule – an evolution for which we have more than enough historical examples. Or to resist that fate and convince our fellow citizens of the difference that it makes to have access to a fully functional third power. In striving for the latter option, we have to ensure the quality of our work by “taking rights seriously”[28] and by ensuring the rationality and proportionality of the exercise of sovereign rights over Europe’s citizens. In addition, our justice must be rendered in fully transparent procedures and by way of well-reasoned judgements which are given as timely as possible.
In doing so, we will prove to the public that giving justice is as such the most noble mission for judges to pursue. I am convinced that building a strong judiciary along those lines will enhance or even restore the people’s trust in the national and European judiciary. People’s trust in our work will in the end be the best protection of our independence.
***
[1] Kant distinguished between a republican and a democratic constitution. According to his understanding, the separation of powers is not guaranteed in a democracy, where legislative and executive powers are in the hands of the citizens, but only in a republican constitution. See Immanuel Kant, Essay on Perpetual Peace, Kant-W Vol. 11, pp. 204-208 (in particular 207 on the separation of powers).
[2] See Secretary of the European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 11.
[3] In this sense namely Callies, in: Callies/Ruffert, EU-Vertrag (Lissabon), 6th edition 2022, Art. 2, para. 30.
[4] In the context of the interpretation of Article 11 of the Charter, the Court consistently emphasizes that the fundamental rights laid down in this article “constitute one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society governed by the rule of law”. See CJUE, judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited.
[5] See, for example, the provisions in the field of the Union’s external action [Articles 21 (1), 24 (2) and (3), 31(1) and 32 TEU), and in the field of the common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control [Articles 67 (1) and 80 TFEU].
[6] See, in this regard, the explanations relating to the symbolical meaning of the European Flagg in the Interinstitutional Style Guide, Annex A1, https://style-guide.europa.eu/en/content/-/isg/topic?identifier=annex-a1-graphics-guide-european-emblem.
[7] See, with regard to the acts of the EU institutions, CJUE, judgment of 8 April 2025, European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited, and the general definition under https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/rule-of-law.html.
[8] See Secretary of the European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 11.
[9] See, to that effect, CJUE, judgments of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑156/21, EU:C:2022:97, paragraphs 124 and 125 and the case-law cited, and of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraphs 64-67.
[10] CJUE, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited.
[11] See, to that effect, CJUE, judgments of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others, C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraph 229, and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 43.
[12] CJUE, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, para 73 and the case-law cited.
[13] See, to that effect, CJUE, judgments of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others, C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraph 229; of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 43, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, para 44 and the case-law cited.
[14] CJUE, judgments of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C‑156/21, EU:C:2022:97, paragraphs 233 and 234; of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑157/21, EU:C:2022:98, paragraphs 265 and 266. See also CJUE, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, paragraph 73.
[15] CJUE, judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:311, paragraphs 63 and 64 and the case-law cited.
[16] According to Article 1 (1) and (2) of the Spanish constitution: “ … Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates as the highest values of its legal order, liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism. … National sovereignty is vested in the Spanish people, from whom emanate the powers of the State.”
In the German Basic law, if the first section (articles 1 to 19) is exclusively dedicated to the protection of fundamental rights, the further structural principles of the German constitution are enshrined in its Article 20, that is the very first provision of the second section.
See also articles 1 and 2 of the Czech constitution, article 1 of the constitution of the French Republic, articles 1 and 2 of the Italian constitution, article 1 of the constitution of Greece, articles 1 to 3 of the Portuguese constitution and articles 1 to 3 of the Slovakian constitution.
[17] CJUE, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C‑204/21, EU:C:2023:442, para. 67 and the case-law cited.
[18] Walter Hallstein, Die EWG – Eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Rede anlässlich der Ehrenpromotion (Universität Padua, 12. März 1962), in: Walter Hallstein & Thomas Oppermann eds., Europäische Reden p. 341, 343); Cf. Robert Lecourt, Rôle de la Cour de justice dans le développement de l’Europe, Revue du Marché Commun 273 (1963): “Peut-on concevoir une Europe sans pouvoir et un pouvoir sans juridiction?”.
[19] See Alexander Hamilton, The Judiciary Department, Federalist n° 78, available at https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493470 (23.02.2026).
[20] See for the composition of the European Council and the Council, Articles 10 (2), 15 (2) and 16 (2) TEU, and for the involvement of the national Parliaments in the legislative process Article 12 TEU and the Protocole n° 2 to the TEU Treaty.
[21] See CJUE, judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party), C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraphs 114 to 122; of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party), C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraphs 112 to 120.
[22] See CJUE, judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party), C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 164; of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party), C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 161.
[23] CJUE, judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraphs 49 and 50.
[24] CJUE, judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 55.
[25] See CJUE, judgment of 26 February 2026, Commission v Hungary (Droit de fournir des services de médias dans une radiofréquence), C‑92/23, EU:C:2026:108, paragraph 357.
[26] See CJUE, judgment of 26 February 2026, Commission v Hungary (Droit de fournir des services de médias dans une radiofréquence), C‑92/23, EU:C:2026:108, paragraph 362.
[27] See Tudor, What Democracy Does … And Does Not Do, Journal of Democracy, available at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-democracy-does-and-does-not-do/ (23.2.2026) and the studies referred to in this article. As for autocracies, the author underlines that “While autocracies sometimes achieve rapid gains, they also produce volatility, repression, and data manipulation”, which have adverse effects impeding economic growth. See also Palmer, No, Autocracies Don’t Make Economies Great, Cato Commentary Institute, November 23, 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/no-autocracies-dont-make-economies-great# (23.2.2.26)
[28] Dworkin’s seminal study, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), has inspired the scholarly research on the protection of fundamental rights by the European judiciary, see i.a. Coppel, O’Neill, The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?, 29 CML Rev. (1992), 669; Lockhart, Weiler, ‘“Taking rights seriously” seriously: The European Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence – part I’, 32 CML Rev. (1995), 51.